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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY EUGENE PLUMB, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. Case No. 14465 
PENELOPE JEANNE PLUMB, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Where the custodial parent and child are residents of 
a foreign state (South Dakota) and the other parent is a 
resident of the forum state (Utah), does the forum state 
have jurisdiction to adjudicate the child's custody? 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant/Appellant specially appeared pursuant to the 
District Court of Salt Lake County's Order to Show to contest 
said Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the custody of her 
child Scott domiciled in South Dakota- On June 27, 1975, her 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was denied by Judge 
Gordon R. Hall (R.51) who later ordered custody to be awarded 
to Plaintiff/ Respondent (R.62,63). 
RELIEF REQUESTED ON APPEAL 
Appellant prays that this court set aside Judge Hall's 
January 13, 197 6 Order and dismiss the Order to Show Cause 
because the District Court of Salt Lake County did not have 
jurisdiction to hear or decide the custody of Scott Plumb since 
he and his mother were domiciliaries of South Dakota. 
FACTS 
On July 26, 1971, Appellant/Defendant Penelope and 
Respondent/Plaintiff Larry were married in Wilmot, South Dakota 
(R.l). On April 9, 1974 the parties were granted a Decree 
of Divorce by the District Court for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah (R.8,9,10). Pursuant to said Decree^Penelope was 
awarded the custody of their minor child Scott (R.8,9,10). 
Since August, 1974, Penelope and Scott have been domiciled 
in South Dakota (R.24, 48,49). On August 18, 1975, pursuant 
to Larry's Motion and Affidavit the District Court for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, entered its Order to appear before 
said court and show cause why custody of Scott should not 
be given to Larry (R.31). Penelope was served in South Dakota 
by mail pursuant to Rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
-2-
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cedure (R.23). Penelope appeared in the Utah Court only to 
contest its jurisdiction over her (R.34,39, 41-51,54,55). 
On January 16, 1976, Judge Gordon R. Hall entered his Order 
that the custody of Scott be changed to Larry (R.62,63). 
Subsequently Larry went to South Dakota and persuaded Penelope 
to relinquish Scott to him pursuant to the Utah Order. Larry 
and Scott are currently residing in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953) states in 
part that: 
The Court shall have continuing jurisdiction to 
make such subsequent changes or new orders with 
respect to the support and maintenance of the 
parties, the custody of the children and their 
support and maintenance, or the distribution of 
the property as shall be reasonable and necessary. 
Section 30-3-5 evidences the legislators1 intent that Utah 
courts hear custody disputes subsequent to divorce decrees. 
When the child and parent are in a foreign jurisdiction the 
law prohibits Utah Courts from exercising this continuing 
jurisdiction. The law is summarized on this point in Restate-
ment of Conflicts of Laws, § 117, P.177 which says, "A state 
can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to determine 
the custody of children * * * only if the domicile of the person 
placed under custody * * * is within the state." 
Justice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court 
in the famous case of Sampsell v« Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 
763, 777, 197 P.2d 739, 748, has summarized the various theories 
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which courts have espoused for gaining jurisdiction in custody 
disputes as follows: 
Several theories have been advanced with respect 
to the correct basis for jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of a child custody proceeding. 
According to one theory, jurisdiction over child-
ren's custody is based on in personam jurisdic-
tion over the children's parents. Anderson v. 
Anderson, 74 W.V. 124, 126, 81 S.E. 706. 
Another theory regards the question of custody 
as simply one of status and as such subject to 
the control of the courts of the state where the 
child is domiciled. Restatement of Conflicts, 
117, 148; see Goodrich Custody of Children, 7 
Corn. L.Q. 12; 2 Beale Conflicts of Law, pp. 717; 
Dorman v. Friendly, 146 Fla. 732, 740, 1 S.2d 734. 
A third theory requires the child to be physically 
present within the state, on the ground that the 
basic problem before the court is to determine 
what the best interest of the child is, and the 
court most qualified to do so is the one having 
access to the child. See Stunberg, Children and 
Conflict of Laws, 8 U. of Chicago Law Review 42, 
55-56; Stunberg, Conflicts of Laws, pp. 299; Sheehy 
v. Sheehy, 88 N.H. 223, 225, 186 A. 1, 107 ALR 365. 
It should be noted that in Sampsell the trial court 
had personal jurisdiction over all parties because the out-
of-state parties voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of 
the California court. The only question before the California 
Supreme Court was whether California was the proper forum 
to decide this custody dispute. It appears beyond any question 
that the finding of California jurisdiction in Sampsell was 
based on the finding of a domicile for the child in California. 
-4-
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POINT I. THE UTAH COURT DID NOT HAVE PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER PENNY PLUMB. 
None of the conduct complained of in Larry Plumb's 
Affidavit and Motion for Order to Show Cause and Request for 
Temporary Custody (R.24-26) alleges any acts or misconduct 
on the part of Defendant Penny Plumb within the State of Utah 
which would allow personal jurisdiction via the Utah Long 
Arm Statute, Section 78-27-24, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
It should be noted in Larry Plumb's Affidavit and Motion that 
the only paragraph which could be construed as indicating 
acts committed in Utah are contained in paragraph two (2). 
In 1974 Penny Plumb had legal custody and guardianship of 
Scott (R.8,9) and thus did not need permission to leave Utah 
with her child. Therefore, paragraph 2 does not trigger the 
Utah Long Arm Statute. 
If kidnapping was suspected, several jurisdictions 
would hold that
 5South Dakota was only a temporary domicile 
and therefore only Utah was Scott's domicile; Ex parte Lorenz, 
242 P.2d 200; 4 ALR 2d at page 15; and Ehrenzweig, Conflict 
of Laws, § 87, P.287 (West Pub. Co. 1962). In August, 1974, 
Penelope returned with Scott to her home state (R.48,49), 
where she was raised and married, having been granted the 
legal custody of Scott by the District Court for Salt Lake 
County (R.8,9). Larry did not initiate this action until 
-5-
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April 18, 1975 (R.31). There was no kidnapping-
Penelope Plumb's appearance before this Court on May 
28, 1975 at 2:00 p.m. does not give the Court personal juris-
diction over her because she and her counsel made only a special 
appearance for the sole purpose of contesting this Court's 
jurisdiction over her. Utah Courts allow out-of-state persons 
to make special appearances to contest jurisdiction so such 
persons do not have to gamble that a subsequent Utah Order 
will not be granted full faith and credit elsewhere because of 
a jurisdictional defect, but by a special appearance may attack 
the jurisdictional problem in the initiating court without 
prejudice to the out-of-state litigant. It should be further 
noted besides her contest of the Utah Court's jurisdiction 
the Defendant has not submitted any papers to this Court nor 
has she called any witnesses. 
On May 28, 1975 after Judge Gordon R. Hall assured Penny 
Plumb's counsel that allowing the Plaintiff to preserve a record 
would not affect the special appearance status, the testimony 
of several witnesses was preserved as a courtesy to Plaintiff 
and the Court. 
The Utah Court does not have personal jurisdiction over 
Penny Plumb. 
POINT II. SCOTT PLUMB WAS NOT DOMICILED 
IN UTAH 
It is settled law that minor children whose parents are 
-6-
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divorced take the domicile of the parent to whose custody they 
have been legally given. Restatement, Conflicts of Law, Section 
32, page 57 (1934). It is also settled law that, "to acquire 
a domicile of choice, a person must establish a dwelling place 
with the intention of making it his home . . . . The fact of 
physical presence at a dwelling place and the intention to make 
it a home must concur; if they do so even for a moment the change 
of domicile takes place." Ibid., Section 15, White v. Tennant, 
31 W.V. 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888), Winans v. Winans, 205 Mass. 
388, 91 N.E. 391 (1910). 
Since August, 1974 Penny and Scott Plumb have been phy-
sically present in the State of South Dakota where they have 
made their home and where they intend to continue maintaining 
their home. (R.24,48,49). Thus follows the conclusions which 
are supported by the Restatement and the case law that Penny 
and Scott Plumb are domiciled in the State of South Dakota and 
not in Utah. 
POINT III. SCOTT PLUMB WAS NOT PHYSICALLY 
••••'•' PRESENT IN UTAH. 
This is a factual question which must be answered in 
the negative since all parties admit Scott was in South Dakota 
(R.24,48,49). 
-7-
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POINT IV. OTHER STATES FIND NO JURISDICTION 
IN LIKE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
We search in vain for a theory which will vest the Utah 
Court with the power to adjudicate this custody dispute. Justice 
Traynor mentioned theory number one which is in personam juris-
diction over the child's parents and theory number three which 
is the child's physical presence within the State, but, the 
weight of the authority and the better theory is number two 
which requires the child to be domiciled in the forum state. • 
See Kruse v. Reuse, 150 Kan. 946, 96 P.2d 849; In re Hughes, 
73 Ariz. 97, 237 P.2d 1009; Elliot v. Elliot, 181 Ga. 545, 182 
S.E. 845; In re Erving, 109 N.J.Eq. 294, 157 A.161; State ex rel 
Larson v. Larson, 190 Minn. 489, 252 N.W. 329; Dorman v. Friendly, 
146 Fla. 732, 1 So.2d 734; Gilman v. Morgan, 158 Fla. 605, 
29 So.2d 37 2; Duryea v. Duryea, 46 Idaho 512, 269 P. 987; McAdams . 
v. McFerron, 180 Miss. 644, 178 So. 333; Lake v. Lake, 63 Wyo. 
375, 409 to 413, 182 P.2d 824; Callahan v. Callahan, 296 Ky. 
444, 177 S.W. 2d 565; Commonwealth ex rel Graham v. Graham, 
367 Pa. 553, 80 A.2d 829; Commonwealth ex rel Freed v. Freed, 
17 2 Pa. Super. 276, 93 A.2d 863; In re Alderman, 157 N.C. 507, 
73 S.E. 126; 2 Beale, Conflicts of Laws, Ch. 5, § 144.3, pp. 
717 to 719; 2 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment (2d Ed.), Ch. 15, 
§ 15.32, pp. 216, 217; 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 5, pp. 52, 53; 
31 C.J., Infants, § 6, pp. 988, 989; 17 Am.Jur., Divorce and 
Separation, § 689, pp. 524. 
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Typical of the above cited cases and annotations is the 
1959 decision by the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of 
Leach v. Leach, 184 Kan. 335, 336 P12d 425, 428, which arose 
out of an effort by the mother of a child divorced in Kansas 
to obtain a modification of the custody order concerning the 
child who was physically with his father in the State of New 
Mexico. The Court held that the father and child had changed 
their domicile to New Mexico, thereby divesting the Kansas Court 
of jurisdiction. The Court said, 
. . . This continuing jurisdiction is to obtain 
as long as the children are domiciled in Kansas, 
but the Court can have no extra territorial jur-
isdiction which conflicts with the jurisdiction 
of the courts of another state where the children 
may have become domiciled subsequent to the cus-
tody orders entered by the courts of Kansas. Any 
attempt on the part of our courts to assert con-
tinuing jurisdiction over children domiciled in 
sister states would be unseemly, and such orders 
would not be entitled to full faith and credit 
in the courts of any state . . . ." 
This is but typical of the language employed by the many courts 
who have been unable to find jurisdiction when the custodial 
parent and the child are domiciled in a foreign jurisdiction. 
Application of Enke, 287 P.2d 19, 129 Mont. 353, cert 
denied 350 U S 923, 100 L.ed 808, 76 S Ct 212 (1955) states 
the majority view that a minor child's domicile is the state 
with jurisdiction to decide his custody. In Enke the parents 
were married in Montana, divorced in California, with the two 
minor children returning to Montana with their mother who was 
awarded their custody in the California Decree. Later the father 
-9-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had the original Decree modified in California and armed with 
an Order went to Montana where he sought enforcement by a writ 
of habeas corpus with the above cited opinion resulting. The 
Montana Court held that California did not have jurisdiction 
to modify its own Decree because the custodial parent and the 
children were domiciled in Montana citing the Restatement of 
Conflicts §§ 146,32, 117 and Montana cases. 
The Enke court analyzed the landmark Sampsell case as 
has been done herein, and several other leading cases to buttress 
the court's holding. From this authority the Montana court 
reasoned that children are recognized as distinct entitys by 
the law apart from their parents which the court calls at least 
a "res" and is the real party in interest. Thus, to decide 
its best interests the "res" needs to be before the court or 
there is no jurisdiction even if both parents are properly before 
the court. The Enke court then maintains that authority to 
the contrary appears in the dictum of Stetson v. Stetson, 80 
Me. 483, 15 A.60, and Meredith v. Krauthoff, 191 Mo. App. 149, 
187, 177 S.W. 1112. 
In Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624, 625, 
40 ALR 937, 938, decided in 1925, Judge Cardozo used the follow-
ing language: 
"The jurisdiction of a state to regulate the 
custody of infants found within its territory 
does not depend upon the domicile of the 
-10-
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parents. It has its origin in the protection 
that is due to the incompetent or helpless. 
* * * For this, the residence of the child 
suffices/ though the domicile be elsewhere. 
* * * But the limits of the jurisdiction are 
suggested by its origin. The residence of 
the child may not be used as a pretense for 
the adjudication of the status of parents 
whose domicile is elsewhere, nor for the 
definition of parental rights dependent upon 
status." 
In Johnson v. Johnson, 105 Ariz. 233, 462 P.2d 782 (1969), 
the custodial parent (mother) and son were domiciled in Calif-
ornia while the father initiated custody litigation in Arizona. 
The Arizona court had original jurisdiction in the matter but 
held they had no continuing jurisdiction when the child was 
later domiciled in California. 
The Johnson court analyzed some of the conflicting views 
on this point but concluded that all the courts were most interested 
in the child's welfare and that the state where the child is 
domiciled is in a much better position to inquire into the child's 
condition and in fact has a duty to look out for the children 
domiciled therein. The court noted that an impecunious custodial 
parent may be an ideal parent but lack the funds to travel to 
a foreign jurisdiction and present this fact through counsel, 
witness, etc. because of poverty. The court then cited its 
former decisions and Griffen v. Griffen, 95 Or 78, 187 P 598, 
and Ex Parte Lorenz, 242 P.2d 200 as precedents for its holding 
in Johnson. 
-11-
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Hoefer v. Hoefer, 353 P. 2d 1066, 67 N.M. 180 (i960) fol-
lowed the majority of states requiring the child to be domiciled 
within the state to allow the state1s courts to litigate the 
child's custody. In Hoefer the custodial parent and child were 
in New Mexico and the father was seeking to enforce a custody 
order entered in Kansas subsequent to the parties' Kansas divorce* 
The New Mexico court cited Kansas case law to the effect that 
the state where the child is domiciled is the proper court to 
decide custody. Then the court quotes with approval Joseph 
H. Beale's Treatise on Conflicts of Laws (1935), Sec. 144.3 
which says, 
"If after a divorce the party to whom 
custody was given removes with the child 
to another state, this would seem to give 
the second state jurisdiction over the 
custodyp and put an end to the jurisdiction 
of the first state, for after the divorce 
each party may change domicile at will, 
and the child's domicile changes with that 
of the parent in whose custody he has been 
placed." 
The New Mexico Court also cited the sections of the Re-
statement of Conflicts 117 and 32 as supporting their holding. 
In candor the court noted there were differing opinions on the 
question. 
For other opinions following the rationale outlined here-
in please see the Colorado Supreme Courts opinions in People ex 
rel. Wagner v. Torrence, 94 Colo. 47, 27 P. 2d 1038; Hodgen v. Byrne] 
98 P.2d 1000 (1940), Ohio's Heiney v. Heiney, 321 N.E. 2d 611 
-12-
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(Oh. App. 1973); Washington's Ehrich v. Ehrich, 499 P.2d 216 
(Wash App. 1972); Groves v. Bur to, 186 P.2d 300, 109 Wash 112; 
and Georgiafs Von Gorder v. Von Gorder, 179 S.E.2d 750 (Ga. 
1971); and Fernandez v. Fernandez, 208 S.E.2d 498 (Ga. 1974). 
CONCLUSION 
The rationale behind the decisions requiring the child 
to be domiciled in the forum state lies in the hardship a find-
ing of jurisdiction would have upon impecunious people like 
Penelope Plumb (R.67). The hardship is that any time the former 
spouse wishes he may initiate a new custody petition, have it 
served by mailing and thereby require the out-of-state spouse 
with custody to return to the forum state to defend the action. 
Conversely, if this Court does not find jurisdiction in the 
instant case the Utah parent, Larry Plumb, may claim there is 
a hardship imposed on him in being forced to travel to the foreign 
state to initiate his cause of action. This hardship is not 
unjustified since only the initiator of the custody action knows 
the merit of his cause. Therefore, it is logical that he be 
the one to travel to the distant jurisdiction and not the cus-
todial parent. Most importantly, the jurisdiction where the 
child resides will have far greater access to expert testimony 
as to how the child has been cared for since the last order. 
In subsequent custody disputes the only issue is whether there 
'•'.•• . . ' - 1 3 - • • • - . 
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exists changed circumstances since the last order. Obviously 
the jurisdiction where the child is domiciled will be in a much 
better position to adjudicate this issue because the child!s 
physician, records, neighbors, social worker, etc., will be 
in that jurisdiction. 
According to the better rule and the weight of authority 
the child, Scott Plumb, needs to be a domiciliary of Utah before 
this Court can exercise jurisdiction in the matter before it. 
Scott Plumb is not domiciled in the State of Utah but 
in the State of South Dakota, therefore Judge Gordon R. Hall's 
January 13, 1976, Order should be set aside and the Order to 
Show Cause dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
DATED this fy day of April, 1976. 
•h 
LL&£ 
-GORDON F \r ESPLIN J 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
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